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In the landmark case Texas v. White, decided in 1869, the United States Supreme Court ruled that states could not unilaterally secede from the Union, affirming the perpetual nature of American federalism and reshaping the legal understanding of state sovereignty in the aftermath of the Civil War. The case arose from a financial dispute involving bonds but soon developed into a constitutional reckoning over the legitimacy of Texas’s Confederate-era government and the broader meaning of Union.

Case Background

The case began with a seemingly technical legal matter. During the final months of the Civil War, the Confederate government of Texas transferred U.S. Treasury bonds—originally issued to the state a decade earlier—to private merchants George White and John Chiles in exchange for medicine and supplies. These men had effectively loaned money to the Confederacy, betting that they could redeem the bonds later for full value.

After the war, they tried to collect. But the U.S. Treasury refused to pay, arguing that the transaction was unauthorized and that anyone who had supported the rebellion must bear the financial consequences. Texas’s new Union-backed government sued to block payment altogether, claiming the bond transfers were invalid and the Confederate regime had no legal authority to dispose of them.

The lawsuit targeted private parties like White and Chiles, who had acquired the bonds during the war and, in some cases, redeemed them after the Confederacy had collapsed. The Reconstruction government of Texas asked the Supreme Court to declare the wartime transfers void and to compel the return of the bonds—so that Texas, now reestablished under federal authority, could redeem them through proper channels and use the funds for postwar recovery.

To resolve the dispute, the Supreme Court had to answer much more than a financial question. Was Texas still a state during the rebellion? Could its Confederate government enter into binding legal agreements? And most importantly—could any state legally leave the Union in the first place?

The Constitutional Questions at Stake

The technical question before the Court was whether the bonds had been validly transferred. But more fundamentally, the case raised sweeping questions:

  • Did the acts of a Confederate state government carry legal weight?
  • When did Texas cease to be a state of the Union—if at all?
  • If Texas had ceased to be a state, how could it rejoin the Union?

The U.S. Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase—a former Treasury Secretary under Lincoln—used the opportunity to define the constitutional nature of the Union itself. He wrote, “If it is true that the State of Texas was not, at the time of filing this bill, or is not now, one of the United States, we have no jurisdiction of this suit, and it is our duty to dismiss it. We are very sensible of the magnitude and importance of this question.”

The Court’s Decision

Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Chase (pictured, top) concluded that Texas had remained a state throughout the Civil War, despite its attempt to secede. The Court declared that the Union was “perpetual” and “indissoluble,” and that individual states had no legal right to withdraw unilaterally. Because Texas had never ceased to be a state, it retained standing to sue in the Supreme Court—and its Reconstruction-era government was entitled to reclaim state property transferred without lawful authority.

The Court held that, although Texas had never ceased to be a state, its Confederate government lacked lawful authority. Chief Justice Chase distinguished between the state’s continued conceptual legal existence within the Union and the illegitimate regime that had taken power during the rebellion. Secession, he argued, was constitutionally void from the outset; but those who governed in defiance of the Union could not enter into binding legal agreements on the state’s behalf.

This distinction allowed the Court to uphold Texas’s standing while declaring the wartime bond transfers invalid. Because the Confederate authorities lacked legal capacity to dispose of public assets, the bonds remained state property. The Reconstruction government, as the lawful successor, was entitled to reclaim them or recover any proceeds obtained through unauthorized redemption.

In practice, the Court enjoined further payment on the disputed bonds and ordered their return—but questions about already-redeemed bonds were left for lower courts or future proceedings to resolve. The ruling preserved Texas’s financial interests while leaving open the practical challenges of enforcement.

Dissent and Partial Concurrence

Justice Robert Grier filed the sole full dissent, arguing that Texas, having seceded and fought against the Union, could not now assert rights in the Supreme Court as if nothing had changed. In his view, Texas had ceased to function as a state in the constitutional sense and lacked standing to sue. He agreed that the bonds should not be repaid—but not because the wartime transfers were invalid, as the majority held. Rather, Grier’s reasoning was rooted in the idea that a state in rebellion could not expect legal protection or financial recovery from the Union it had renounced.

Justices Noah Swayne and Samuel Miller dissented only in part. While they agreed with the majority that the Confederate-era bond transactions were invalid and supported the relief ordered, they argued that the case should have been dismissed for lack of standing. In their view, Texas could not appear before the Supreme Court because it had seceded and ceased to function as a state within the Union.

To hear the case at all, they contended, improperly legitimized the current state government and assumed Texas’s continuing statehood. They asserted that readmission to the Union could only occur through congressional action.

The partial dissents revealed a conflict about who had the authority to restore former Confederate states. On one side was the Court, recognizing Texas’s continued legal existence; on the other was Congress, which insisted on setting the terms for readmission and representation.

Significance for Texas and the Nation

Texas v. White implicitly challenged aspects of Congressional Reconstruction, which had treated the Southern states as having forfeited normal constitutional status. In response, Congress doubled down on its authority—maintaining military rule in the South and requiring former Confederate states to adopt new constitutions and ratify the Fourteenth Amendment before regaining representation in Congress and ending federal occupation.

In the short term, the ruling strengthened the legal framework for Reconstruction by affirming the authority of federal officials and Union-backed state governments to void Confederate-era contracts and reorganize institutions that had supported the rebellion. In the longer view, however, the Court’s declaration of the Union’s permanence reinforced the idea that the former Confederate states had never truly left—and thereby it may have helped hasten the reintegration and the eventual end of Reconstruction.

To this day, Texas v. White stands as the primary judicial precedent against secession in the United States. The ruling is often cited in discussions of national unity, federal supremacy, and the legal status of states. Although movements for state sovereignty or “Texit” occasionally resurface in Texas politics, the Court’s 1869 opinion leaves little constitutional room for such claims.

Full Text of Texas v. White

The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an original suit in this court, in which the State of Texas, claiming certain bonds of the United States as her property, asks an injunction to restrain the defendants from receiving payment from the National government, and to compel the surrender of the bonds to the State.

It appears from the bill, answers, and proofs, that the United States, by act of September 9, 1850, offered to the State of Texas, in compensation for her claims connected with the settlement of her boundary, $10,000,000 in five percent bonds, each for the sum of $1000; and that this offer was accepted by Texas.

One-half of these bonds were retained for certain purposes in the National treasury, and the other half were delivered to the State. The bonds thus delivered were dated January 1, 1851, and were all made payable to the State of Texas, or bearer, and redeemable after the 31st day of December, 1864. They were received in behalf of the State by the comptroller of public accounts, under authority of an act of the legislature, which, besides giving that authority, provided that no bond should be available in the hands of any holder until after indorsement by the governor of the State.

After the breaking out of the rebellion, the insurgent legislature of Texas, on January 11, 1862, repealed the act requiring the indorsement of the governor and, on the same day, provided for the organization of a military board, composed of the governor, comptroller, and treasurer, and authorized a majority of that board to provide for the defense of the State by means of any bonds in the treasury, upon any account, to the extent of $1,000,000. The defense contemplated by the act was to be made against the United States by war.

Under this authority, the military board entered into an agreement with George W. White and John Chiles, two of the defendants, for the sale to them of one hundred and thirty-five of these bonds, then in the treasury of the State, and seventy-six more, then deposited with Droege & Co., in England, in payment for which they engaged to deliver to the board a large quantity of cotton cards and medicines. This agreement was made on January 12, 1865. On March 12, 1865, White and Chiles received from the military board one hundred and thirty-five of these bonds, none of which were indorsed by any governor of Texas. Afterward, in the course of the years 1865 and 1866, some of the same bonds came into the possession of others of the defendants, by purchase or as security for advances of money.

Such is a brief outline of the case. It will be necessary hereafter to refer more in detail to some particular circumstances of it.

The first inquiries to which our attention was directed by counsel arose upon the allegations of the answer of Chiles: (1) that no sufficient authority is shown for the prosecution of the suit in the name and on the behalf of the State of Texas, and (2) that the State, having severed her relations with a majority of the States of the Union, and having by her ordinance of secession attempted to throw off her allegiance to the Constitution and government of the United States, has so far changed her status as to be disabled from prosecuting suits in the National courts.

The first of these allegations is disproved by the evidence. A letter of authority, the authenticity of which is not disputed, has been produced, in which J. W. Throckmorton, elected governor under the constitution adopted in 1866 and proceeding under an act of the State legislature relating to these bonds, expressly ratifies and confirms the action of the solicitors who filed the bill, and empowers them to prosecute this suit.

It is further proved by the affidavit of Mr. Paschal, counsel for the complainant, that he was duly appointed by Andrew J. Hamilton, while provisional governor of Texas, to represent the State of Texas in reference to the bonds in controversy, and that his appointment has been renewed by E. M. Pease, the actual governor. If Texas was a State of the Union at the time of these acts, and these persons, or either of them, were competent to represent the State, this proof leaves no doubt upon the question of authority.

The other allegation presents a question of jurisdiction. It is not to be questioned that this court has original jurisdiction of suits by States against citizens of other States, or that the States entitled to invoke this jurisdiction must be States of the Union. But it is equally clear that no such jurisdiction has been conferred upon this court of suits by any other political communities than such States.

If, therefore, it is true that the State of Texas was not, at the time of filing this bill, or is not now, one of the United States, we have no jurisdiction of this suit, and it is our duty to dismiss it.

We are very sensible of the magnitude and importance of this question, of the interest it excites, and of the difficulty, not to say impossibility, of so disposing of it as to satisfy the conflicting judgments of men equally enlightened, equally upright, and equally patriotic. But we meet it in the case, and we must determine it in the exercise of our best judgment, under the guidance of the Constitution alone.

Some not unimportant aid, however, in ascertaining the true sense of the Constitution may be derived from considering what is the correct idea of a State, apart from any union or confederation with other States. The poverty of language often compels the employment of terms in quite different significations, and of this hardly any example more signal is to be found than in the use of the word we are now considering.

It would serve no useful purpose to attempt an enumeration of all the various senses in which it is used. A few only need be noticed. It describes sometimes a people or community of individuals united more or less closely in political relations, inhabiting temporarily or permanently the same country; often it denotes only the country or territorial region, inhabited by such a community; not unfrequently it is applied to the government under which the people live; at other times, it represents the combined idea of people, territory, and government.

It is not difficult to see that, in all these senses, the primary conception is that of a people or community. The people, in whatever territory dwelling, either temporarily or permanently, and whether organized under a regular government, or united by looser and less definite relations, constitute the state.

This is undoubtedly the fundamental idea upon which the republican institutions of our own country are established. It was stated very clearly by an eminent judge, in one of the earliest cases adjudicated by this court, and we are not aware of anything in any subsequent decision of a different tenor.

In the Constitution, the term “state” most frequently expresses the combined idea just noticed, of people, territory, and government. A “state,” in the ordinary sense of the Constitution, is a political community of free citizens, occupying a territory of defined boundaries, and organized under a government sanctioned and limited by a written constitution, and established by the consent of the governed.

It is the union of such states, under a common constitution, which forms the distinct and greater political unit which that Constitution designates as the United States, and makes of the people and states which compose it one people and one country.

The use of the word in this sense hardly requires further remark. In the clauses which impose prohibitions upon the States in respect to the making of treaties, emitting of bills of credit, and laying duties of tonnage, and which guarantee to the States representation in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, are found some instances of this use in the Constitution. Others will occur to every mind.

But it is also used in its geographical sense, as in the clauses which require that a representative in Congress shall be an inhabitant of the State in which he shall be chosen, and that the trial of crimes shall be held within the State where committed.

And there are instances in which the principal sense of the word seems to be that primary one to which we have adverted, of a people or political community, as distinguished from a government.

In this latter sense, the word seems to be used in the clause which provides that the United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion.

In this clause, a plain distinction is made between a State and the government of a State.

Having thus ascertained the senses in which the word state is employed in the Constitution, we will proceed to consider the proper application of what has been said.

The Republic of Texas was admitted into the Union, as a State, on the 27th of December, 1845. By this act, the new State, and the people of the new State, were invested with all the rights, and became subject to all the responsibilities and duties of the original States under the Constitution.

From the date of admission until 1861, the State was represented in the Congress of the United States by her senators and representatives, and her relations as a member of the Union remained unimpaired.

In that year, acting upon the theory that the rights of a State under the Constitution might be renounced, and her obligations thrown off at pleasure, Texas undertook to sever the bond thus formed, and to break up her constitutional relations with the United States.

On the 1st of February, a convention, called without authority but subsequently sanctioned by the legislature regularly elected, adopted an ordinance to dissolve the union between the State of Texas and the other States under the Constitution of the United States, whereby Texas was declared to be “a separate and sovereign State,” and “her people and citizens” to be “absolved from all allegiance to the United States, or the government thereof.”

It was ordered by a vote of the convention and by an act of the legislature that this ordinance should be submitted to the people, for approval or disapproval, on the 23d of February, 1861.

Without awaiting, however, the decision thus invoked, the convention, on the 4th of February, adopted a resolution designating seven delegates to represent the State in the convention of seceding States at Montgomery, “in order,” as the resolution declared, “that the wishes and interests of the people of Texas may be consulted in reference to the constitution and provisional government that may be established by said convention.”

Before the passage of this resolution, the convention had appointed a committee of public safety and adopted an ordinance giving authority to that committee to take measures for obtaining possession of the property of the United States in Texas, and for removing the National troops from her limits.

The members of the committee, and all officers and agents appointed or employed by it, were sworn to secrecy and to allegiance to the State. Commissioners were at once appointed, with instructions to repair to the headquarters of General Twiggs, then representing the United States in command of the department, and to make the demands necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes of the committee.

A military force was organized in support of these demands, and an arrangement was effected with the commanding general by which the United States troops were engaged to leave the State, and the forts and all the public property not necessary to the removal of the troops were surrendered to the commissioners.

These transactions took place between the 2d and the 18th of February, and it was under these circumstances that the vote upon the ratification or rejection of the ordinance of secession was taken on the 23d of February. It was ratified by a majority of the voters of the State.

The convention, which had adjourned before the vote was taken, reassembled on the 2d of March and instructed the delegates already sent to the Congress of the seceding States to apply for admission into the confederation and to give the adhesion of Texas to its provisional constitution.

It proceeded also to make the changes in the State constitution which this adhesion made necessary. The words “United States” were stricken out wherever they occurred and the words “Confederate States” substituted, and the members of the legislature, and all officers of the State, were required by the new constitution to take an oath of fidelity to the constitution and laws of the new confederacy.

Before, indeed, these changes in the constitution had been completed, the officers of the State had been required to appear before the committee and take an oath of allegiance to the Confederate States.

The governor and secretary of state, refusing to comply, were summarily ejected from office.

The members of the legislature, which had also adjourned and reassembled on the 18th of March, were more compliant. They took the oath and proceeded, on the 8th of April, to provide by law for the choice of electors of president and vice-president of the Confederate States.

The representatives of the State in the Congress of the United States were withdrawn, and, as soon as the seceded States became organized under a constitution, Texas sent senators and representatives to the Confederate Congress.

In all respects, so far as the object could be accomplished by ordinances of the convention, by acts of the legislature, and by votes of the citizens, the relations of Texas to the Union were broken up and new relations to a new government were established for them.

The position thus assumed could only be maintained by arms, and Texas accordingly took part, with the other Confederate States, in the war of the rebellion which these events made inevitable.

During the whole of that war, there was no governor, or judge, or any other State officer in Texas who recognized the National authority. Nor was any officer of the United States permitted to exercise any authority whatever under the National government within the limits of the State except under the immediate protection of the National military forces.

Mr. Justice Grier, dissenting.

I regret that I am compelled to dissent from the opinion of the majority of the court on all the points raised and decided in this case.

The first question in order is the jurisdiction of the court to entertain this bill in behalf of the State of Texas. The original jurisdiction of this court can be invoked only by one of the United States. The Territories have no such right conferred on them by the Constitution, nor have the Indian tribes who are under the protection of the military authorities of the government.

Is Texas one of these United States? Or was she such at the time this bill was filed, or since? This is to be decided as a political fact, not as a legal fiction. This court is bound to know and notice the public history of the nation.

If I regard the truth of history for the last eight years, I cannot discover the State of Texas as one of these United States. I do not think it necessary to notice any of the very astute arguments which have been advanced by the learned counsel in this case to find the definition of a State, when we have the subject treated in a clear and common-sense manner by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Hepburn & Dundass v. Ellzey.

He says: “The question is whether the plaintiffs, as residents of the District of Columbia, can maintain an action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Virginia. This depends on the act of Congress describing the jurisdiction of that court. The act gives jurisdiction to the Circuit Courts in cases between a citizen of the State in which the suit is brought and a citizen of another State. To support the jurisdiction in this case, it must appear that Columbia is a State.”

He continues: “On the part of the plaintiff, it has been urged that Columbia is a distinct political society, and is therefore a ‘State’ according to the definition of writers on general law. This is true; but, as the act of Congress obviously uses the word ‘State’ in reference to that term as used in the Constitution, it becomes necessary to inquire whether Columbia is a State in the sense of that instrument. The result of that examination is a conviction that the members of the American Confederacy only are the States contemplated in the Constitution.”

He notes: “The House of Representatives is to be composed of members chosen by the people of the several States, and each State shall have at least one representative. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each State. Each State shall appoint, for the election of the executive, a number of electors equal to its whole number of senators and representatives. These clauses show that the word ‘State’ is used in the Constitution as designating a member of the Union, and excludes from the term the signification attached to it by writers on the law of nations.”

Now we have here a clear and well-defined test by which we may arrive at a conclusion with regard to the questions of fact now to be decided.

Is Texas a State, now represented by members chosen by the people of that State and received on the floor of Congress? Has she two senators to represent her as a State in the Senate of the United States? Has her voice been heard in the late election of President? Is she not now held and governed as a conquered province by military force?

The act of Congress of March 2, 1867, declares Texas to be a “rebel State,” and provides for its government until a legal and republican State government could be legally established. It constituted Louisiana and Texas the fifth military district and made it subject not to the civil authority, but to the military authorities of the United States.

It is true that no organized rebellion now exists there, and the courts of the United States now exercise jurisdiction over the people of that province. But this is no test of the State’s being in the Union. Dacotah is no State, and yet the courts of the United States administer justice there as they do in Texas. The Indian tribes, who are governed by military force, cannot claim to be States of the Union. Wherein does the condition of Texas differ from theirs?

Now, by assuming or admitting as a fact the present status of Texas as a State not in the Union politically, I beg leave to protest against any charge of inconsistency as to judicial opinions heretofore expressed as a member of this court, or silently assented to.

I do not consider myself bound to express any opinion judicially as to the constitutional right of Texas to exercise the rights and privileges of a State of this Union, or the power of Congress to govern her as a conquered province, to subject her to military domination, and keep her in pupilage. I can only submit to the fact as decided by the political position of the government, and I am not disposed to join in any essay to prove Texas to be a State of the Union when Congress has decided that she is not.

It is a question of fact, I repeat, and of fact only. Politically, Texas is not a State in this Union. Whether rightfully out of it or not is a question not before the court.

But conceding now the fact to be as judicially assumed by my brethren, the next question is whether she has a right to repudiate her contracts?

Before proceeding to answer this question, we must notice a fact in this case that was forgotten in the argument. I mean that the United States are no party to this suit, and refusing to pay the bonds because the money paid would be used to advance the interests of the rebellion.

It is a matter of utter insignificance to the government of the United States to whom she makes the payment of these bonds. They are payable to the bearer. The government is not bound to inquire into the bona fides of the holder, nor whether the State of Texas has parted with the bonds wisely or foolishly.

And although, by the Reconstruction Acts, she is required to repudiate all debts contracted for the purposes of the rebellion, this does not annul all acts of the State government during the rebellion, or contracts for other purposes, nor authorize the State to repudiate them.

Now whether we assume the State of Texas to be judicially in the Union (though actually out of it) or not, it will not alter the case. The contest now is between the State of Texas and her own citizens.

She seeks to annul a contract with the respondents, based on the allegation that there was no authority in Texas competent to enter into an agreement during the rebellion.

Having relied upon one fiction, namely, that she is a State in the Union, she now relies upon a second one, which she wishes this court to adopt—that she was not a State at all during the five years that she was in rebellion.

She now sets up the plea of insanity, and asks the court to treat all her acts made during the disease as void.

We have had some very astute logic to prove that judicially she was not a State at all, although governed by her own legislature and executive as “a distinct political body.”

The ordinance of secession was adopted by the convention on the 18th of February, 1861, submitted to a vote of the people, and ratified by an overwhelming majority.

I admit that this was a very ill-advised measure. Still, it was the sovereign act of a sovereign State, and the verdict on the trial of this question, “by battle,” as to her right to secede, has been against her.

But that verdict did not settle any question not involved in the case. It did not settle the question of her right to plead insanity and set aside all her contracts, made during the pending of the trial, with her own citizens, for food, clothing, or medicines.

The same organized political body, exercising the sovereign power of the State, which required the indorsement of these bonds by the governor also passed the laws authorizing the disposal of them without such indorsement.

She cannot, like the chameleon, assume the color of the object to which she adheres, and ask this court to involve itself in the contradictory positions that she is a State in the Union and was never out of it, and yet not a State at all for four years, during which she acted and claims to be an organized political body, exercising all the powers and functions of an independent sovereign State.

Whether a State de facto or de jure, she is estopped from denying her identity in disputes with her own citizens. If they have not fulfilled their contract, she can have her legal remedy for the breach of it in her own courts.

But the case of Hardenberg differs from that of the other defendants. He purchased the bonds in open market, bona fide and for a full consideration.

Now it is to be observed that these bonds are payable to bearer, and that this court is appealed to as a court of equity.

The argument to justify a decree in favor of the commonwealth of Texas as against Hardenberg is simply this: these bonds, though payable to bearer, are redeemable fourteen years from date. The government has exercised her privilege of paying the interest for a term without redeeming the principal, which gives an additional value to the bonds. Ergo, the bonds are dishonored. Ergo, the former owner has a right to resume the possession of them, and reclaim them from a bona fide owner by a decree of a court of equity.

This is the legal argument, when put in the form of a logical sorites, by which Texas invokes our aid to assist her in the perpetration of this great wrong.

A court of chancery is said to be a court of conscience, and however astute may be the argument introduced to defend this decree, I can only say that neither my reason nor my conscience can give assent to it.

Mr. Justice Swayne.

I concur with my brother Grier as to the incapacity of the State of Texas, in her present condition, to maintain an original suit in this court. The question, in my judgment, is one in relation to which this court is bound by the action of the legislative department of the government.

Upon the merits of the case, I agree with the majority of my brethren.

I am authorized to say that my brother Miller unites with me in these views.

(In 19th-century Supreme Court practice, the final decree was often summarized by the Reporter of Decisions rather than issued as a separate, formal document. What follows is the official summary of the Court’s decree as published in the United States Reports).

The decree overruled the objection interposed by way of plea in the answer of defendants to the authority of the solicitors of the complainant to institute this suit, and to the right of Texas, as one of the States of the National Union, to bring a bill in this court.

It declared the contract of January 12, 1865, between the Military Board and White and Chiles void, and enjoined White and Chiles from asserting any claim under it.

It decreed that the complainant was entitled to receive the bonds and coupons mentioned in the contract, as having been transferred or sold to White and Chiles, which, at the several times of service of process in this suit, were in the possession or under the control of the defendants respectively, and any proceeds thereof which had come into such possession or control, with notice of the equity of the complainant.

It enjoined White, Chiles, Hardenberg, Birch, Murray Jr., and other defendants from setting up any claim to any of the bonds and coupons described in the first article of said contract.

It further held that the complainant was entitled to restitution of such of the bonds and coupons and proceeds as had come into the possession or control of the defendants respectively.

And, it appearing upon the pleadings and proofs that before the filing of the bill, Birch and Murray had received and collected from the United States the full amount of four other bonds, and that Hardenberg, before the commencement of the suit, had deposited thirty-four bonds in the Treasury Department for redemption (which he claimed to have received payment for from the Secretary of the Treasury before service of process in this suit), and that counsel for Birch and Murray and for Hardenberg respectively desired to be heard in respect to those payments and their effect, it was ordered that time for such hearing should be given to those parties.

Both the complainant and the defendants had liberty to apply for further directions in respect to the execution of the decree.

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